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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure of
intangibles and financial analysts’ earnings forecasts properties.
Design/methodology/approach – Disclosures about intangible assets were hand-collected through
content analysis of annual reports of a sample of US non-financial firms, while analysts’ earnings
forecasts properties were collected from Bloomberg Professional database. The authors relied on
correlation and multivariate regression analyses to test the research hypotheses.
Findings – The results show that increased intangible disclosures affect analysts’ earnings forecasts
accuracy, dispersion, and favourable consensus recommendations. However, this effect varies
according to the nature of intangible assets.
Practical implications – The results may be of interest to different market participants such as
corporate managers, financial analysts, and standards setting bodies that recently published
guidelines on voluntary disclosure of intangibles.
Originality/value – This study develops a new comprehensive index to measure the content of
narrative disclosures about a large number of intangibles, such as human, structural, and relational
assets. The findings contribute to the current debate on the value-relevance of narrative disclosures on
intangibles to investors and financial analysts.
Keywords Intangibles, Financial analysts, Disclosure, Consensus recommendation,
Forecast dispersion, Forecast error
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Investments in intangible assets have become significant value creators for many firms
and economic sectors. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (2013), these intangible assets have even exceeded investments in
physical and financial assets in several developed economies including the USA.
Despite their economic importance, most intangible investments are not recognized
as assets by current accounting standards and must often be immediately expensed
when incurred. The current accounting treatment of intangibles may have adverse
socio-economic consequences for firms, financial markets, and society in general
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(AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee, 2003; Zeghal and Maaloul, 2011).
From the investors’ perspective, prior studies show that the non-recognition of
intangibles exacerbates information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and
outsiders (Aboody and Lev, 2000), resulting in a firm’s mis-valuation (Lev et al., 2005),
making firm shares relatively illiquid (Boone and Raman, 2001), and increasing its cost
of capital (Seow et al., 2006). These consequences of non-recognition of intangibles, in
turn, can lead to a misallocation of resources in the capital market.
From the financial analysts’ perspective, prior studies suggest that the reporting of
expensed intangibles increases the error of future earnings forecasts by financial
analysts (Gu and Wang, 2005; Higgins, 2013), which is consistent with the difficulty of
processing complex intangibles information. The information complexity of intangibles
may make it difficult for analysts to integrate them into the decision-making process
and make their task to forecast future earnings more complicated. In this setting,
previous studies (Amir et al., 2003; Whitwell et al., 2007) have shown that analysts do
not, or cannot, fully analyse the wealth creation potential of a firm’s intangible assets
and, consequently, fail to include them in their forecasts and recommendations.
Given the current accounting treatment of intangibles, and the adverse
consequences that may result from this treatment, several initiatives have been
undertaken in the last few years by different standard-setting bodies (Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 2001; Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), 2003; International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2010; OECD, 2013) as
well as by financial analysts’ associations (European Federation of Financial
Analysts Societies (EFFAS), 2008). These initiatives intend to enhance the quality of
the information provided to investors, financial analysts, and other capital markets
participants. They also propose different frameworks and guidelines that are
intended to encourage managers to voluntarily disclose intangibles information
beyond financial statements, in order to offset any shortcomings in accounting
information regarding intangibles.
Our paper focusses on the benefits to financial analysts of voluntary disclosure of
intangibles. The objective of our study is to investigate the impact of voluntary
disclosure of intangibles on analysts’ earnings forecast error, analysts’ earnings
forecast dispersion, and average analysts’ consensus recommendation. We aim to
contribute to the literature on the value-relevance of voluntary disclosure of intangibles
to financial analysts. Voluntary disclosures about intangible assets are likely to
provide information on future earnings that is not already incorporated into the
financial statements (Hope, 2003; Orens and Lybaert, 2010). Consequently, this
incremental information may be useful to financial analysts who actively seek to
release new information to investors through their earnings forecasts and buy/sell
recommendations.
Using a content analysis of annual reports of a random sample of 125 non-financial
US firms, our results show that increased intangible disclosures affect analysts’
earnings forecasts accuracy, dispersion, and favourable consensus recommendations.
However, this effect varies according to the nature of intangible assets.
We intend to make several contributions to the literature. First, while most previous
studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2001; Gu andWang, 2005; Jones, 2007) are limited to examining
a few elements of intangibles such as R&D and advertising expenses, we broaden the
scope of previous research by developing a more comprehensive measure of
intangibles disclosures, which takes into account a large number of intangibles such as
human, structural, and relational assets. Second, our most significant contribution to
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this research is the investigation of the role of intangible narrative information in the
analysts’ earnings forecasts’ properties. It is well known that information about
intangibles is not fully and completely integrated into financial statements (AAA
Financial Accounting Standards Committee, 2003; Zeghal and Maaloul, 2011).
Narrative disclosures about those intangibles in annual reports may represent an
important source of information that is potentially useful to financial analysts. Third,
unlike prior studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Eng and Teo, 2000), which have
focussed on financial disclosures, we use the content analysis method to collect all
financial and non-financial (narrative) information on intangibles from the annual
reports. Fourth, we develop and test a new index based on the content of disclosure
about intangibles (i.e. whether it is qualitative or quantitative and whether it is
historical or forward-looking). This new index is developed to mitigate the criticism vis-
à-vis disclosure indices used in previous studies.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
prior literature on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and analyst forecast
properties. Section 3 presents our research objective and hypotheses. Section 4
describes the sample and methodology used in this study while the empirical results of
the data analysis are detailed in Section 5. The final section summarizes and concludes
with suggestions for future research.
2. Related literature
Previous accounting research suggests that voluntary disclosure of financial
information can help financial analysts to better understand a firm’s future
prospects. For instance, using data from the Financial Analysts Federation Report
as a proxy for voluntary disclosure, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with
more informative disclosure policies have more accurate analysts’ earnings forecasts
and less dispersion among individual analysts’ forecasts. Barron et al. (1999) rely on
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) ratings by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as a measure of the informativeness of a firm’s disclosure
policy. Their results show that analyst forecast accuracy is better and dispersion is
lower at higher levels of MD&A quality ratings.
In another study, Eng and Teo (2000) investigate the effect of annual report
disclosures on the properties of analysts’ forecasts in the Singapore Stock Exchange.
They document that the level of financial disclosures in annual reports is positively
related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts and negatively related to the
dispersion of earnings forecasts, provided there is no big earnings surprise. Using a
sample from 22 countries, Hope (2003) also confirms that firm-level annual report
disclosures are positively related to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts,
suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to financial analysts.
Prior accounting research has also explored the effects of non-financial information
disclosure on financial analysts’ forecasts properties. Vanstraelen et al. (2003) examine
the impact of the Jenkins Committee non-financial disclosure levels on analysts’
earnings forecasts accuracy and dispersion. They report that the disclosure of non-
financial forward-looking information by Belgian, Dutch, and German firms is
associated with better accuracy and lower dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. In
a related study, Orens and Lybaert (2007) investigate whether the use of non-financial
information by sell-side financial analysts affects their forecast accuracy. Based on a
survey of financial analysts in Belgium, they report that financial analysts who use
more non-financial, forward-looking information in their forecasting models exhibit
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better accuracy in their earnings forecasts. In a comparative study between North
American and continental European firms, Aerts et al. (2007) examine the association
between web-based corporate performance disclosure and financial analyst behaviour.
Their results show that performance disclosure tends to reduce the dispersion of
analysts’ earnings forecasts, but only for North American firms.
Jones (2007) also provides mixed evidence on the value-relevance of R&D related
disclosures to analysts’ forecasts. While disclosures about development stage R&D
enhance analysts’ sales forecast, Jones (2007) finds limited effect of R&D related
disclosures on the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. However,
Hsu and Chang (2011) provide evidence that firm-specific disclosure of intangibles
relates negatively with analysts’ forecast errors and dispersions. Using a sample of
high-tech companies in Taiwan, they conclude that firms can reduce the information
risk through voluntary disclosures on intangibles. More recently, Dhaliwal et al. (2012)
examine the effect of voluntary disclosure of information about corporate social
responsibility (CSR) practices on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Their
results show that the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report reduces analysts’ earnings
forecast errors.
3. Research objective and hypotheses development
Our literature review shows that voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial
information is generally value-relevant to financial analysts. However, there is limited
evidence on the role of disclosures about intangible assets in reducing analysts’
earnings forecast error and dispersion and in improving their consensus
recommendation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of
the voluntary disclosure of several categories of intangibles (human, structural, and
relational assets) on analysts’ earnings forecast error, analysts’ earnings forecast
dispersion, and average analysts’ consensus recommendation.
Prior research (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Eng and Teo, 2000; Hope, 2003; Higgins,
2013) suggests that financial analysts generally rely on all the information disclosed by
firms to forecast their future earnings. Therefore, we contend that, if voluntary
disclosure on intangibles provides relevant information on a firm’s future prospects
and its wealth creation potential, we should expect that analysts’ forecasts accuracy[1]
will be enhanced at higher levels of intangibles disclosures.
We state this prediction formally as our first hypothesis:
H1. Voluntary disclosure of intangibles is negatively related to the error in analysts’
earnings forecasts.
Prior literature (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Eng and Teo, 2000) suggests that two
factors may potentially explain the observed dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts:
differences in the information or in the forecasting models used by financial analysts. In
the first case, the difference in information causes dispersion in earnings forecasts,
because each analyst has access to different private information beyond the publicly
available one. When there is an information asymmetry between individual analysts,
increased intangibles related disclosure level may reduce their forecasts dispersion,
because each one will have access to a comparable information set.
In the second case, the differences in forecasting models contribute to the dispersion
in earnings forecasts, because each individual analyst has his own forecasting model
that is unique, even if the information (public and private) available to all analysts may
be the same. As a consequence, an increased level of intangibles disclosure can
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contribute to the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, because individual analysts
can draw different conclusions from the same observed disclosures. Given that there is
now more information included in their different forecasting models, we can expect a
higher dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Although these two theoretical arguments imply that increased disclosure may have
two opposing effects on earnings forecasts dispersion among financial analysts, prior
studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Eng and Teo, 2000; Vanstraelen et al., 2003) mostly
support a negative association between increased disclosure levels and analyst forecast
dispersion. This result leads to our second hypothesis:
H2. Voluntary disclosure of intangibles is negatively related to the dispersion of
analysts’ earnings forecasts.
The average consensus recommendation among financial analysts to invest or divest in
a firm refers to their opinions on the firm’s stocks. The analysts’ opinions can take
different forms: buy, outperform, hold, underperform, or sell. Thus, stocks with “high”
average consensus recommendation are considered as stocks with the most favourable
consensus recommendation (dominated by buy and outperform recommendations).
Inversely, stocks with “low” average consensus recommendation are considered as
stocks with the least favourable consensus recommendation (dominated by
underperform and sell recommendations) (Barber et al., 2001).
Because earnings forecasts are linked to value, and recommendations reflect
analysts’ opinions of value relative to current price, earnings forecasts, and stock
recommendations should be linked (Bradshaw, 2004). Prior research has focussed
mostly on analysts’ earnings forecasts, despite the fact that financial analysts are not
paid merely to forecast earnings but also to make timely stock recommendations
(Schipper, 1991). Previous studies (Orens and Lybaert, 2010; Ghosh and Wu, 2012)
suggest that financial analysts pay considerable attention to the non-financial
(narrative) information in making their stock recommendations.
Indeed, improved disclosures about intangibles could reduce information
asymmetry among analysts and, consequently, may increase the likelihood of the
most favourable consensus recommendations. In other words, more intangibles
disclosures could lead to a reduction in uncertainty about firms’ future earnings. Due to
the decreased uncertainty, financial analysts probably agree more about a firm’s stock
recommendation. All things being equal, in our study we expect to find that voluntary
disclosure on intangibles can support financial analysts in making their stock
recommendations. This assertion leads to our third and final hypothesis:
H3. Voluntary disclosure of intangibles is positively related to the likelihood of the
most favourable consensus recommendation.
4. Sample and methodology
4.1 Data and sample selection
Disclosures about intangible assets were hand-collected through content analysis of
annual reports, while data on analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations and
other financial variables were collected from Bloomberg Professional database. Our
initial sample is based on US firms listed on the S&P500 index during 2009[2]. Given
the time-consuming process of coding annual reports, we tried to use a representative
sample with a comparable size to those used in previous studies. For instance, Eng and
Teo (2000) use a sample of 125 firms while Vanstraelen et al. (2003) and Orens and
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Lybaert (2007) rely on a sample size of 120 firms. Following Li et al. (2008), we draw
from our starting index a random sample of 125 non-financial firms, which represents
25 per cent of the total population.
4.2 Variable measurement
Table I provides a description of the study’s variables.
4.2.1 Analysts’ forecasts properties variables. The forecast error (F_ERROR) is
measured as the absolute value of the difference between actual[3] earnings per share
(EPS) and median[4] forecasted EPS, deflated by the absolute value of actual
EPS[5] (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003; Jones, 2007). This measure is obtained
as follows:
Actual EPSiMedian f orecasted EPSi
Actual EPSi


The forecast dispersion (F_DISP) is measured as the standard deviation of EPS forecasts
between individual analysts, deflated by the absolute value of actual EPS
F_ERRORit+1 Analysts’ earnings forecast error for year t+1
F_DISPit+1 Analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion for year t+1
Av. CONS_RECit+1 Average consensus recommendation among analysts for year t+1
EXT_IN DISCit Index measuring the extent of intangible assets disclosure for year t
EXT_HU DISCit Sub-index measuring the extent of human assets disclosure for year t
EXT_ST DISCit Sub-index measuring the extent of structural assets disclosure for year t
EXT_RE DISCit Sub-index measuring the extent of relational assets disclosure for year t
CONT_IN DISCit Index measuring the content of intangible assets disclosure for year t
CONT_HU DISCit Sub-index measuring the content of human assets disclosure for year t
CONT_ST DISCit Sub-index measuring the content of structural assets disclosure for year t
CONT_RE DISCit Sub-index measuring the content of relational assets disclosure for year t
F_ERRORit Analysts’ earnings forecast error for year t
F_DISPit Analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion for year t
Av. CONS_RECit Average consensus recommendation among analysts for year t
AN_COVit Analyst coverage for year t, as measured by the number of analysts following
the firm
LOSSit Dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm reports negative EPS and zero
otherwise
SIZEit Firm size for year t, as measured by the logarithm of the firm’s market
capitalization (MARKET CAP) in $ millions
PROFit Firm profitability for year t, as measured by return on assets (ROA)
GR_OPPit Firm’s growth opportunities for year t, as measured by market-to-book value of
equity ratio
MIN & CONSTit Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the mining and construction
sector and zero otherwise
MANUFACTit Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the manufacturing sector
and zero otherwise
UTILITIESit Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the utilities sector and
zero otherwise
TRADEit Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the trade sector and
zero otherwise
SERVICESit Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the services sector and
zero otherwise
Table I.
Variable description
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(Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Jones, 2007; Simpson, 2010). This measure is obtained as
follows:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
J
PJ
j¼1 Forecasted EPSMedian f orecasted EPSð Þ2
q
Actual EPSj j
The average consensus recommendation (Av. CONS_REC) is calculated by converting
each of the analysts’ current recommendations[6] into a number from 5 (a perfect buy) to 1
(a perfect sell) and taking the average[7] (Barber et al., 2001).
All required data to measure our three dependent variables is collected from
Bloomberg Professional database to ensure consistency. Furthermore, to make sure
that the annual reports are available to financial analysts at the time their forecasts and
recommendations are issued, we measure our dependent variables as of the end of the
financial year following the release of the annual report[8].
4.2.2 Intangibles disclosure indices. Using content analysis of annual reports, we
created two self-constructed indices to measure intangibles disclosures.
First index: extent of intangibles disclosure (EXT_IN DISC). The extent of intangibles
disclosure index (EXT_IN DISC) reports the percentage of intangibles items disclosed
over the subset of items from a predefined list (see Li et al., 2008). The index includes 61
different intangible items (22 human assets items, 18 structural assets items, and 21
relational assets items), each taking a score of one if the item is found in the annual report
and zero otherwise. EXT_IN DISC is, therefore, a ratio of the actual score relative to the
total score that a firm may disclose. This index is calculated as follows:
EXT_IN DISC ¼
Xn
t¼1
Xi;j=nj
where nj is the number of intangible items considered “reportable” by the company for
firmi (61 items in three categories), Xi,j¼ 1 if the intangible item is disclosed, 0 if
intangible item is not disclosed, so that 0⩽EXT_IN DISC⩽ 1.
Three sub-indices are also calculated for each category of intangibles (human,
structural, and relational assets). These three sub-indices are: extent of human assets
disclosure (EXT_HU DISC), extent of structural assets disclosure (EXT_ST DISC), and
extent of relational assets disclosure (EXT_RE DISC). The EXT_IN DISC is, therefore,
the average index of the three sub-indices.
Second index: content of intangibles disclosure (CONT_IN DISC). Prior studies
(Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007) posit that voluntary
disclosure is a multidimensional and complex concept and suggest relying on the
content of disclosure as a proxy for its quality. Therefore, we developed our own index
based on the content of intangibles disclosure (CONT_IN DISC), i.e. if it is qualitative or
quantitative and if it is historical or forward-looking.
Using the sentence as the analysis unit for content analyses of annual reports, we
assigned the following marks, based on the relevance of informative potential, for each
sentence containing intangibles related information:
• 1 mark: if the sentence contains qualitative historical information on intangibles.
• 2 marks: if the sentence contains quantitative historical information on
intangibles.
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• 3 marks: if the sentence contains qualitative forward-looking information on
intangibles.
• 4 marks: if the sentence contains quantitative forward-looking information on
intangibles.
Our second index is therefore calculated as:
CONT_IN DISC ¼ Sum of marks assigned
Even if it was repeated several times in the report, we took into account an item
disclosed by the firm only once.
As for our first index, we also calculated three sub-indices for each category of
intangibles (human, structural, and relational assets). These three sub-indices are: content
of human assets disclosure (CONT_HU DISC), content of structural assets disclosure
(CONT_ST DISC), and content of relational assets disclosure (CONT_RE DISC).
The CONT_IN DISC is therefore the total index of the three sub-indices.
4.2.3 Control variables. Previous accounting research shows that several factors
affect analysts’ forecasts properties (Higgins, 2013). Following Jones (2007) and
Simpson (2010), we use lagged forecast error (F_ERRORt), forecast dispersion
(F_DISPt), and average consensus recommendation (Av. CONS_RECt) of the current
year to control for their effects on the next year’s forecast error (F_ERRORt+1), forecast
dispersion (F_DISPt+1), and average consensus recommendation (Av. CONS_RECt+1).
We also control for analyst coverage (AN_COVit), as measured by the number of
analysts following the firm (Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Simpson, 2010). Previous studies
show that greater analyst coverage results in higher competition among financial
analysts, and this finding provides incentives for analysts to undertake extensive
research about the firm and to forecast accurately its future earnings (Higgins, 2013).
Furthermore, prior research (Ghosh and Wu, 2012) also suggests that analysts’
earnings forecasts are more biased and less accurate for firms reporting losses than for
firms with positive earnings. To control for this effect, we include a dichotomous
variable that equals one if the firm reports negative EPS and zero if not (LOSSit)
(Gu and Wang, 2005; Higgins, 2013).
We also include firm size (SIZEit), as measured by the logarithm of the firm’s market
capitalization. Prior studies have shown that financial analysts make better forecasts for
larger firms (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003). In agreement with prior studies
(Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Simpson 2010), we also control for firm profitability (PROFit) and its
growth opportunities (GR_OPPit), in order to account for analysts’ overreaction to these firm
attributes. PROFit is measured by return on assets, while GR_OPPit is measured by market-
to-book value of equity ratio. Finally, we control for industries using sector dummies based
on two-digit SIC codes. These industries are: mining & construction (SIC 10-19),
manufacturing (SIC 20-39), utilities (SIC 40-49), trade (SIC 50-59), and services (SIC 70-89).
5. Empirical results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table II presents the descriptive statistics of the study’s variables. The mean (median)
of analysts’ earnings forecast error (F_ERRORit+1) is 0.729 (0.380), while the mean
(median) of analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion (F_DISPit+1) is 0.077 (0.038). These
figures are comparable to those reported in prior studies (Vanstraelen et al., 2003;
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Higgins, 2013). Average analysts’ recommendation consensus (Av. CONS_RECit+1) is a
censored variable that varies between 1 and 5 with a mean (median) of 3.932 (4.000).
Table II shows also that the mean (median) of our first index, based on the extent of
intangibles disclosure (EXT_IN DISCit), is 0.396 (0.393), indicating that US firms in our
sample provide, on average, approximately 40 per cent of the information that could be
disclosed on intangibles in their annual reports. Furthermore, Table II shows that these
companies disclose, on average, more information on structural assets (0.477) than
relational (0.391) or human assets (0.321).
Concerning our second index based on the content of intangibles disclosure
(CONT_IN DISCit), Table II reports that the mean (median) of this index is 46.91 (47.5)
and varies between 21 and 72 for scores assigned to the information disclosed on
intangibles. Table II also reports that US firms in our sample disclose, on average, more
information on structural assets (19.85) than relational (17.03) or human assets (10.03).
As for control variables, the number of analysts following the firms (AN_COVit)
varies between four and 47 analysts per firm, with a mean of approximately
19.14 per cent of our sample firms have reported negative financial results in 2009. The
mean value of market capitalization (SIZEit) is $21,493 million and varies between
$1,576 and $308,956 million, reflecting the fact that our sample consists of firms of
different sizes. Finally, Table II reports that 14 per cent of our sample belongs to mining
and construction (MIN & CONSTit), 58 per cent to manufacturing (MANUFACTit),
10 per cent to utilities (UTILITIESit), 7 per cent to trade (TRADEit), and 11 per cent to
services (SERVICESit) sectors.
Variables Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
F_ERRORt+1 0.729 1.191 0.380 0.002 8.420
F_DISPt+1 0.077 0.106 0.038 0.006 0.663
Av. CONS_RECt+1 3.932 0.489 4 2.556 4.833
EXT_IN DISCt 0.396 0.084 0.393 0.213 0.574
EXT_HU DISCt 0.321 0.105 0.318 0.091 0.591
EXT_ST DISCt 0.477 0.123 0.500 0.222 0.722
EXT_RE DISCt 0.391 0.132 0.381 0.048 0.762
CONT_IN DISCt 46.91 11.745 47.5 21 72
CONT_HU DISCt 10.03 3.681 10 3 20
CONT_ST DISCt 19.85 7.224 19.50 5 42
CONT_RE DISCt 17.03 7.234 17 1 44
F_ERRORt 0.635 1.125 0.210 0.005 8.880
F_DISPt 0.078 0.100 0.049 0.004 0.707
Av. CONS_RECt 3.859 0.522 4 2.667 5
AN_COVt 18.840 7.660 18.500 4 47
LOSSt 0.140 0.345 0 0 1
MARKET CAPt 21,493 36,934 9,267 1,576 308,956
SIZEt 9.274 1.081 9.109 7.36 12.64
PROFt 5.634 6.876 4.671 −17.020 35.085
GW_OPPt 2.920 1.757 2.346 0.642 10.262
MIN & CONSTt 0.14 0.351 0 0 1
MANUFACTt 0.58 0.496 1 0 1
UTILITIESt 0.10 0.295 0 0 1
TRADEt 0.07 0.259 0 0 1
SERVICES 0.11 0.316 0 0 1
Notes: n¼ 125. Please see Table I for variable definitions
Table II.
Descriptive statistics
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5.2 Correlation analysis
Table III presents Pearson correlation coefficients among the study’s variables. The
results show that the correlations between earnings forecasts error and intangible
disclosure indices are negative (r¼−0.259 and r¼−0.207) and statistically significant
at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively. This finding supports our H1, and implies
that providing analysts with more intangibles disclosure may enhance their accuracy
in forecasting futures earnings.
Table III also reports that the correlations between earnings forecasts dispersion
and intangibles disclosure indices are negative (r¼−0.284 and r¼−0.251) and
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding supports our H2 and
suggests that increased intangible disclosures reduce information asymmetry between
firms and financial analysts as well as between different analysts.
Finally, Table III shows that the correlations between average consensus
recommendation and intangibles disclosure indices are positive (r¼ 0.239 and
r¼ 0.287) and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This result supports
our H3, and suggests that more intangibles disclosures reduce information
asymmetry among analysts and consequently increases the likelihood of the most
favourable consensus recommendation (dominated by buy and outperform
recommendations).
5.3 Multivariate analysis
5.3.1 Intangibles disclosure and analysts’ earnings forecast error. Table IV reports the
results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression[9] of analyst forecast error on
intangibles disclosure and control variables. In Model 1, we use the extent of
intangibles disclosure index and sub-indices as independent variables while the content
of this index and its sub-indices are used as independent variables in Model 2.
As shown in Table IV, the extent of intangibles disclosure is negatively associated
with analysts’ earnings forecast error ( β¼−3.858), at the 10 per cent statistical
significance level. This negative relation is mainly attributed to the extent of structural
assets disclosure ( β¼−2.764; po0.10), while the extent of disclosures about human
and relational assets is not related to analysts’ earnings forecast errors. The results of
Model 2 show that the association between the content of intangibles disclosure and
analysts’ earnings forecast error is negative but not statistically significant at
conventional levels. The results shown in Table IV only weakly support our H1 and
suggest that the extent rather than the content of intangibles disclosure may be
relevant to financial analysts and may enhance their accuracy in forecasting future
earnings. Our findings, therefore, partially corroborate the results of Jones (2007) who
found a negative relation between the level of disclosures about R&D activities
(one particular intangible item) and analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecast error.
The results in Table IV also show that earnings forecast error of the current year
has a positive and significant impact on the earnings forecast error for the next year,
which is consistent with Jones (2007) and Simpson (2010). The association between the
loss firm variable and analysts’ earnings forecast error is also significantly positive.
This result agrees with prior studies (Gu and Wang, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2012) and
suggests that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more biased and less accurate for loss
firms than for profitable firms. Furthermore, our results show that the association
between a firm’s growth opportunities and analysts’ earnings forecast error is
significantly negative.
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Pearson correlation
matrix
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5.3.2 Intangibles disclosure and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. Table V presents
the results of an OLS regression of analyst forecast dispersion on intangibles disclosure
and control variables. As shown in Table V, the extent of disclosures about relational
assets is negatively related to analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion ( β¼−0.150), at
the 5 per cent statistical significance level. Analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is
also negatively and significantly related to the content of intangibles disclosure
( β¼−0.001; po0.10), and more particularly to the content of relational assets
disclosure ( β¼−0.003; po0.05).
These findings partially support H2 in stating that increased disclosure about
relational assets reduces asymmetric information between individual analysts and
results in less deviation among them when making their earnings forecasts. In contrast,
the extent and content of disclosures about human and structural assets do not affect
analysts’ forecast dispersion. Therefore, our results support Jones (2007). While she
expected a negative association, Jones (2007) did not report a significant relationship
between the level of disclosure about R&D activities (a structural intangible item) and
analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecast dispersion in her study.
Consistent with prior studies ( Jones, 2007; Simpson, 2010), we also find that
earnings forecast dispersion of the current year has a positive and significant impact on
earnings forecast dispersion of the next year. Analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is
also positively and statistically associated with firm profitability. Finally, our findings
show that analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is statistically and negatively
associated with the firm’s growth opportunity.
5.3.3 Intangibles disclosure and average analysts’ consensus recommendation.
Table VI reports the results of the regression of average analysts’ consensus
recommendation on intangibles disclosure and control variables[10].
As shown in Table VI, the extent of disclosure about relational assets is positively
associated with average analysts’ consensus recommendation ( β¼ 0.528) and
marginally significant at the 10 per cent level. In contrast, neither human nor
structural assets disclosures are related to a more favourable consensus
recommendation. Model 2 results show that only the content of human assets
disclosures is positively and significantly related to average analysts’ consensus
recommendation ( β¼ 0.017; po0.05). These results provide weak support for our H3,
which predicts that more intangibles disclosures may reduce information asymmetry
among analysts and, consequently, increase the likelihood of the most favourable
consensus recommendation (dominated by buy and outperform recommendations).
The results in Table VI also show that average consensus recommendation for the
current year has a positive and significant impact on average consensus recommendation
for the following year. We also find that the number of analysts following the firm has a
negative and significant impact on their average consensus recommendation. Finally, our
findings show a significant positive association between firm size and average analysts’
consensus recommendation. This result suggests that financial analysts produce higher
quality research and make more favourable recommendations for larger firms, which is
consistent with prior studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003).
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of voluntary disclosure of intangibles on financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts properties. Using a content analysis of annual reports of a
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sample of 125 US non-financial firms to assess the extent and content of intangibles
disclosures, we report few significant associations between disclosures about intangibles
and analyst forecast properties. First, our results show a negative association between
the extent of disclosures about structural assets and analysts’ earnings forecast error.
This result suggests that these disclosures about structural assets may be relevant to
financial analysts in forecasting future earnings. Second, we report a negative association
between both the extent and content of disclosures about relational assets and analysts’
earnings forecast dispersion. This finding implies that enhanced disclosures about
relational assets may reduce information asymmetry between individual analysts and,
therefore, lower the deviation among them in making more coherent earnings forecasts.
Finally, our results show that the extent of disclosures about relational assets and the
content of human assets disclosures are positively related to average analysts’ consensus
recommendations. This result suggests that financial analysts need different information
about intangibles in their stock recommendations.
Consequently, our findings show that the effect of intangibles disclosures on
financial analysts’ forecast properties varies according to the nature of intangible
assets (human, structural, or relational). They also suggest that financial analysts may
need different information data for their decision-making process, particularly when
they are dealing with narratives about intangibles.
The results of this paper may have several practical implications. First, they suggest
that managers can obtain capital markets benefits by increasing their voluntary
disclosures about intangibles. Second, our results may be of interest to standard setters
and financial analysts’ associations in their assessing the current application of their
proposed frameworks and guidelines for voluntary disclosures about intangibles and
in empirically validating their theoretical statements.
This research is not without its limitations. First, the measurement of average
consensus recommendation variable is open to discussion. In fact, it might be questionable
whether the ratings of the best analysts should receive the same weight as those of less
experienced analysts. However, until now, there is no generally accepted measure for
consensus recommendation, and this variable is rarely examined in the literature. Future
research should develop a more robust measure of consensus recommendation and may
test it on a larger sample. Finally, given the findings of this study are based on a sample of
US firms, future research may examine the effect of narrative disclosure about intangibles
on analyst forecast properties in different institutional settings.
Notes
1. Consistent with prior research, we use the error in analysts’ earnings forecasts as an inverse
measure of forecast accuracy.
2. Analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations were made in 2009 for 2010.
3. Following the prior literature (Eng and Teo, 2000; Hope, 2003), we use actual earnings per
share (EPS) to ensure consistency in the definition and measurement of EPS. The actual
EPS is the earnings realization as provided by Bloomberg.
4. We obtain similar results when we used the mean forecast.
5. We also used the stock price per share as the deflator, and the results were consistent.
6. Analysts’ recommendations can be either buy, outperform, hold, underperform, or sell.
7. Assume five financial analysts follow IBM stock; two say “buy”, one says “hold”; two say
“sell”. To compute an average consensus recommendation, each rating is assigned a value,
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e.g., a buy is a 5; a hold, 3; a sell, 1. The consensus recommendation is the average rating,
weighted by number of analysts: ((2× 5)+ (1× 3)+ (2× 1))/5. Thus the average consensus
recommendation is a 3. Following Barber et al. (2001), stocks with average consensus
recommendation variable greater than 3 are considered as stocks with most favourable
consensus recommendations. Inversely, stocks with average consensus recommendation
variable lower than 3 are considered as stocks with least favourable consensus
recommendations. Our prediction is that voluntary disclosure of intangibles is positively
related to the likelihood of the most favourable consensus recommendations.
8. We also estimated our regressions using our dependant variables for year t+2. The results
are quite similar to those based on year t+1.
9. We also run regression tests to estimate our equations using rank scores. The results are
quite similar to those based on continuous variables. Therefore, our results are robust to the
measurement scale of disclosure indices.
10. Average analysts’ consensus recommendation is a censored variable that varies by definition
between 1 and 5. Therefore, we also run Tobit test to estimate consensus recommendation
regression. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table VI of this paper.
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